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Abstract 
Micro-outsourcing is the process of sourcing work to smaller firms or individuals using 
online sites. Several websites provide a platform to match clients and vendors for 
sourcing jobs. A typical issue with micro-sourcing is information asymmetry regarding 
the actual expertise of vendors. Online platforms bridge this gap using vendors’ prior 
histories and client evaluations. In this study, we examine how the strategic intents of 
vendors as captured by the platform play a moderating role on the relationship between 
project contract duration and client evaluation of vendor performance. Our empirical 
analysis uses project level data of over 6000 completed micro-outsourcing IT projects 
obtained from a leading micro-sourcing IT platform. We find that competency-focused 
strategic intent and goal-focused strategic intent positively moderate the relationship 
between project contract duration and client evaluation of vendor performance; 
whereas cost-focused strategic intent negatively moderates this relationship. 
Contributions and implications for research and practice are discussed. 
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Introduction 
The nature of knowledge-based work and organizations is undergoing a radical transformation in the 21st 
century. Due to near instantaneous and inexpensive sharing of information and data between many 
people in varied locations and an increase in range and reach of coordination mechanisms, small firms are 
increasingly challenging the centralized decision making and expensive bureaucracy based traditional 
business models of global enterprises. These changes are driven by increased processing power, virtually 
infinite storage and increasing bandwidth, which enable small firms to be lean, flexible and creative while 
acting as if they were a large corporation. Digital environments and digitized work provide rich contexts 
for the emergence of such new organizational forms and strategies (Andrade Rojas and Kathuria 2014; 
Vitzthum, Kathuria and Konsynski 2011). Micro-outsourcing, or Outsourcing 2.0, is an exemplar of the 
future of organizations and knowledge-based work and the strategies followed by micro-outsourcing 
vendors are harbingers of business success in future. 
Outsourcing is a key driver of firm competitiveness and profitability and became an established aspect of 
business strategy in the late 20th and early 21st century. While early efforts at outsourcing information 
technology (IT) and business processes were undertaken with an objective to save costs and improve 
efficiencies, another major motivation driving outsourcing activities is the ability to redeploy resources 
and personnel towards more strategic activities. Thus, outsourcing has enabled firms to realize several 
strategic objectives, ranging from reduced time-to-market for innovations to improved organizational 
transformation outcomes (Linder 2004). Consequently, outsourcing of IT, business processes and other 
knowledge-based work continues to be an important subject of managerial and academic attention (Gopal 
and Gosain 2010; Lacity and Willcocks 1998). However, most prior research and practitioner literature is 
focused on outsourcing in the traditional sense. Under this paradigm, outsourcing refers to the use of 
external agents to perform activities or functions that were previously performed within the organization 
(Varadarajan 2009). More formally, IT outsourcing is defined as the “significant contribution by external 
vendors in the physical and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific components of the 
IT infrastructure in the user organization” (Loh and Venkatraman 1992) (p. 9). 
 
Micro-outsourcing represents a new paradigm in the outsourcing of knowledge-based work. While 
outsourcing previously encompassed large sized deals valued in millions of U.S. dollars, spread over a 
multi-year duration, it has now moved into the small and micro deal space. Such outsourcing 
engagements are increasing in numbers, but involve smaller chunks of work that are to be completed in 
days or weeks, and are valued in the range of tens, hundreds, or thousands of U.S. dollars. This movement 
has been facilitated by several themes and meta-trends. On one hand, the modularization and atomization 
of business processes has made outsourcing of smaller sized pieces of work a possibility. On the other 
hand, the rapid proliferation of Web 2.0 technology based project management, communication, and 
open source technologies have created information infrastructures that have enabled organizations to 
manage larger numbers of outsourced projects for development (Constantinides 2012; Saldanha and 
Krishnan 2012; Setia, Rajagopalan, Sambamurthy and Calantone 2012). Furthermore, the trend of 
smaller software applications such as enterprise mobile apps has resulted in smaller project sizes. The 
wide adoption of crowdsourcing and work distribution platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk has 
given an impetus to these developments and led to increasing numbers of small service firms being able to 
find increasing amount of economically viable ‘virtual’ work. Together, these have resulted in a new 
paradigm of Outsourcing 2.0, or micro-outsourcing.  
Micro-outsourcing platforms (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) are used intensively for interaction between 
vendors and clients for projects. Such platforms represent the use of IT to build inter-firm mechanisms 
and relationships for work partnerships (Saraf, Langdon and Gosain 2007). In the triad of vendor-client-
project relationships the IT-based micro-outsourcing platforms work as avenues to reduce and manage 
information asymmetry prevailing in the sourcing work. As such, sourcing interactions require dynamic 
information- and knowledge-processing and exchange for highly interdependent processes using IT 
(Mani, Barua and Whinston 2009). Moreover, sourcing platforms are conduits for fulfilment of the actual 
(and not too strict) contractual agreements between the client and vendor, with the objectives of achieving 
an end goal, fulfillment of psychological contracts with the client (Koh, Ang and Straub 2004), and fit 
between the client and provider (Lee, Miranda and Kim 2004). Although several websites provide a 
platform to match clients and vendors for sourcing jobs, a typical issue with micro-outsourcing platforms 
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is the information asymmetry regarding the actual expertise of vendors. Online platforms try to bridge 
this gap using vendors’ prior histories and client evaluations.   
Vendors working through the micro-outsourcing platforms must accommodate complexities such as the 
dynamic exchange of knowledge and process information with clients, while managing globally 
distributed work, maintaining work productivity, achieving speed and agility, and accommodating 
cultural, administrative and geographical distance between vendors and clients (Ghemawat 2001; 
Saldanha, Melville, Ramirez and Richardson 2013). These challenges and complexities demand that 
vendors adopt appropriate strategies to provide quality service and outcomes in terms of client’s work or 
project performance and subsequent evaluations by the clients.  
One of the important challenges in the micro-outsourcing context is managing larger projects which can 
be challenging due to the nature of the vendor-client relationship, resource constraints of typical vendors 
in this context, the nature of tasks, and the motivation levels of vendors in such tasks (Lacity and 
Willcocks 1998; Lee, Miranda and Kim 2004). As opposed to typical large IT outsourcing contexts, the 
micro-outsourcing context reflects the app-sized world and requires app-sized contracts, and so the 
durations of these contracts can typically be measured in a few days. Such micro-outsourcing 
environments are more amenable to smaller tasks as vendors are able to better manage resources and 
smaller jobs. For instance, an example of micro-outsourcing is the use of the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
platform for creation of data sets for benchmarking. Larger tasks have more opportunities for failure, 
which can result in poor evaluations by the clients of the vendors performing the tasks. Therefore, 
vendors are on the lookout for better ways and strategies for managing longer projects in the micro-
outsourcing context. In sum, a major challenge of micro-outsourcing is the complexity arising due to the 
project scope. Often, scope creep results in higher than expected workload and takes longer duration to 
complete (Xia and Lee 2005), exposing vendors to risks such as to user requirements refinements, and 
planning and execution challenges (Huang and Han 2008; Tiwana and Keil 2009). Thus, structural 
complexity arising from longer duration projects is a major challenge in micro-outsourcing work. Our 
study focuses on this challenge. 
Therefore, a pertinent question is what kind of strategy vendors should follow for managing the 
complexity that arise out of larger projects in the micro-outsourcing context. Our research aims to help 
address this question. Specifically, we address the research question: “What is the relationship between 
contract duration and the performance in vendors in micro-outsourcing? And how can strategic intents 
of vendors affect this relationship?” Such an examination can make significant contributions towards 
current research findings and add to academic discourse on micro-outsourcing. More importantly, there 
is limited academic investigation of the emergent micro-outsourcing paradigm. Furthermore, most extant 
work has examined this phenomenon from the outsourcer perspective. Little, if any, discourse considers 
the strategies appropriate for outsourcing firms (vendors) to succeed under this paradigm. 
The academic literature suggests mixed results for the effects of contract duration on performance of IT 
outsourced projects. On one hand, some scholars found that contract duration has a positive effect on 
performance (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig 2000; Lee, Miranda and Kim 2004). One of the reasons 
for this positive effect is that “it takes time for the IT service vendor to gain experience in servicing the 
client. Hence other things being equal, contracts of longer duration stand a better chance of being highly 
rated by the client” (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig 2000) (p. 114). On the other hand, other findings 
in the literature indicate that shorter projects have better ITO outcomes (Baldwin, Irani and Love 2001; 
Currie 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 1998). One of the reasons for this is that IT outsourcing is an interactive 
process and greater uncertainty and risk in the project increases the amount of time and effort the client 
has to invest in the project (Lacity and Willcocks 1998). Another reason for short-term projects 
performing better is that “short-term contracts motivate providers toward higher performance and allow 
clients to quickly recover from contractual mistakes” (Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lee, Miranda and Kim 
2004). Conversely, longer duration projects can increase the chance of significant disagreements 
occurring between vendors and clients (Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade 2010). 
The above discussion suggests that there could be other factors influencing the impact of contract 
duration on the performance of the vendor in the project. More pertinently, it is not very clear how 
contract duration may impact performance in the micro-outsourcing context. In this study, we theorize 
that the vendor’s strategic intent, formally defined as “a [sustained] obsession with winning at all levels of 
 Strategic Intent in Micro-Outsourcing 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 4 
the organization” (Hamel and Prahalad 1989) (p. 64), is one such factor that will influence the effect of 
contract duration on the client’s evaluation of the vendor’s performance in the micro-outsourcing context.  
We argue that because the micro-outsourcing context is generally devoid of formal setups and procedures 
and because the vendors are individuals, the strategic intent of individuals serves as an important 
indicator to clients. Prior research argues that strategic intents for outsourcing vary. For instance, firms 
may focus on cost or competencies in their strategic intent (Beasley, Bradford and Dehning 2009). We 
draw on this literature and theorize that specific strategic intents of the vendors would have differing 
implications for how well micro-outsourcing vendors perform in projects that are of greater duration. Our 
empirical analysis of over 6000 micro-outsourcing projects sheds light on micro-outsourcing vendor 
strategies that help them manage longer duration projects. Our findings provide a better understanding of 
the strategies that would help vendors in the micro-outsourcing industry manage longer duration and 
more expansive projects. More broadly, by exploring the strategies underlying the success of micro-
outsourcing firms, we contribute towards our collective understanding of this emergent phenomenon and 
help take important steps towards comprehending business success in a world increasingly characterized 
by outsourcing of increasing numbers of small bits of work to large numbers of small firms.  
Background Literature 
The IT outsourcing literature provides the main basis for our theorizing. Information technology 
outsourcing (ITO) has been examined using several theoretical perspectives, including economics, 
strategy, and sociology (Lacity, Khan, Yan and Willcocks 2010). The ITO literature generally concentrates 
on two major types of questions – antecedents of ITO decisions and consequences of ITO. Thus the 
dependent variable of prior empirical studies is either the ITO decision (Babbitt, Karhade and Burke 
2004; Loh and Venkatraman 1992) or the ITO outcome (Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade 2010). For 
instance, some fine-grained measures of outsourcing performance have included degree of outsourcing, 
outsourcing intensity, outsourcing expenditure, technological performance, partnership quality, exchange 
performance, and cost savings achieved (Mahnke, Overby and Vang 2005). Likewise, scholars have 
examined why firms make outsourcing decisions (Hu, Saunders and Gebelt 1997), using theories such as 
Transaction Cost Economics (Hancox and Hackney 2000), strategic management theories (Cheon, Grover 
and Teng 1995), and agency theory (Hall 2005) to explain their findings (Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl 
2008; Tiwana and Bush 2007). 
Research has also examined strategic intent from the perspective of client organizations and has noted 
that despite the rhetoric to outsource strategically, cost reduction has been the most common motive for 
IT outsourcing (Lacity, Khan and Willcocks 2009). Many studies examine the financial value and the 
determinants of financial value creation due to outsourcing activities (Mani, Barua and Whinston 2009). 
Overall, the literature recognizes that alignment of business strategy, contracts, infrastructure and 
technology, culture, strategic partnership, management support, governance committees, and economics 
play a salient part as critical factors for success of ITO projects (Fjermestad and Saitta 2005). 
Notwithstanding these important contributions from prior research, limited research considers 
outsourcing issues from the perspective of the supplier firm, barring some exceptions (Lee, Miranda and 
Kim 2004). As noted by prior research, 49% of the articles adopted the perspective of the client firm, 
while only 16% assumed the perspective of the supplier firm (Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis 2006). In 
particular, to the best of our knowledge, how the strategic intent of vendor firms impacts the performance 
outcomes of vendor firms in the micro-outsourcing context has received sparse attention in the extant 
literature, and our study aims to help fill this knowledge gap. 
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
We anchor our study on the discussions on IT outsourcing (Lacity, Khan, Yan and Willcocks 2010; Lacity, 
Khan and Willcocks 2009) and strategy-process alignment literature in information systems research 
(Tallon 2007; Tallon and Pinsonneault 2011).  
In this study, we examine how the strategic intent of a micro-outsourcing vendor influences its ability to 
manage and perform better in longer duration projects. Strategic intent, defined as “… a [sustained] 
obsession with winning at all levels of the organization” (Hamel and Prahalad 1989) (p. 64) represents 
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objectives “for which one cannot plan” (Hamel and Prahalad 1989) (p. 66). Thus strategic intent is a 
proactive stance in strategizing, reflecting the corporate context (Noda and Bower 1996), which directs the 
accumulation of necessary competencies towards a collective purpose or common target (Lovas and 
Ghoshal 1998). Prior research in strategic management and information systems suggests that strategic 
intent encompasses its “managerial judgments” and “resulting intentions” (Rai and Tang 2013) (p. 2) with 
respect to its interactions with its customers, partners, and suppliers (Christensen 2001). Building on and 
extending prior research on these notions of strategic intent, we argue that the vendor’s strategic intent 
plays a key role in the success of micro-outsourcing firms in longer projects. We provide a 
characterization of three different types of strategic intent of micro-outsourcing firms: Cost- focused 
strategic intent, Goal-focused strategic intent, and Competency-focused strategic intent.  
We define Cost-focused Strategic Intent as the strategic intent that reflects an organizational stance of a 
micro-outsourcing firm (or individual vendor) to deliver information systems services that are of low cost. 
We define Goal- focused Strategic Intent as the strategic intent that emphasizes an organizational stance 
of a micro-outsourcing firm (or individual vendor) to deliver information systems services effectively with 
respect to prior agreed limits of time and materials. Finally, we define Competency-focused Strategic 
Intent as the strategic intent that emphasizes a collective goal of the firm (or individual vendor) to deliver 
information systems services that are based upon high technical and methodological skills. We theorize 
differing performance implications of these three types of strategic intent for the performance of micro-
outsourcing vendors in longer project duration projects.  
Specifically, despite divergent results in prior research, in line with prior research (Lacity and Willcocks 
1998), we expect that project duration has a negative effect on the success of micro-outsourcing projects. 
In the case of micro-outsourcing, the context is an entity serving as a vendor-which is mostly a small or 
single individual, with a limited infrastructure, guidelines, process management, standardization, or even 
a formal set of employee management practices.  However, clients may be firms with strong set ups and 
extensive experience on dealing with outsourcing. Although a formal vendor-client relationship exists in 
the micro-outsourcing environment, the preparedness of the client, and the nuances associated with 
fulfilling such a contract is somewhat in  flux (Ang, Koh, Soon and Straub 2004). Moreover, it is apparent 
that in such settings, the issue of expectation-confirmation for the vendor firm to satisfy the client is a 
major concern (Oliver 1980; Oliver 1993). Due to vendors’ general lack of standardization and limited 
infrastructures, clients’ initial expectations and vendors’ performance evaluation may not align if the 
project duration is longer and there are constant interactions between the client and the vendor. In this 
context, we explore how the effect of project duration on the effectiveness of the vendor’s performance (as 
evaluated by the client) is influenced by the strategic intent of the vendor. In sum, we focus our theoretical 
framing and arguments to examine how vendor firms’ strategy, which manifests in different dimensions 
of the vendor’s strategic intent, moderates the influence of project duration on the performance of the 
vendor to meet the needs of the client (as evaluated by the client).   
First, project duration, as a contractual obligation, involves interactions or encounters between clients 
and vendors in the micro-outsourcing context (Bitner, Brown and Meuter 2000). Longer project duration 
typically means more interactions, more number of contractual milestones, and more intensive and 
interactive relationship between the client and vendor. Intensive and interactive relationships are both 
hard and soft points for stringent evaluations, providing a number of opportunities to evaluate.  
Accordingly, when project duration is high, evaluations are stringent, and may involve a set of evaluative 
milestones, benchmarks, and processes. Although the project may be well completed or delivered, when it 
comes to evaluate multiple aspects, the scores may not be perfect or max out at their highest, as it can be 
with a one-shot evaluation for one aspect.   
Two examples will support our assertion that higher project duration may lead to a decrease in 
evaluations.  First, consider an outsourcing project for data decoding from a textual format to an encoded 
database format. When the contract duration is short, the vendor takes the data, converts it into a 
database, and delivers it to the client.  On the contrary, when the duration is long, the client would look at 
the data at each iteration, may find some flaws, and discover the non-efficient or non-effective aspects of 
the vendor. This leads to low evaluations. A second example may be for outsourcing editing work. While 
editing the whole project at once is a less interactive process, a longer duration of the project will involve 
the client scrutiny in each step of the editing process. Dealing with the nuances of the project and the lack 
of structure of the vendor, may make the client feel that the participation of the vendor was not necessary 
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and that the same results could have been achieved if the work was performed by the client firm itself 
(Levina and Ross 2003). In addition, if the work delivered in the first iteration did not meet the client’s 
expectations and subsequent interactions are required to fix the work, the vendor is likely to receive low 
evaluations. Furthermore, longer duration projects generally have greater uncertainty and less motivated 
vendor participation which leads to participants taking longer to recover from mistakes (Lacity and 
Willcocks 1998).  
In line with these arguments, we posit a negative main effect of contract duration on performance of 
vendors, consistent the views in prior research that performance is lower in projects of longer contract 
duration (Baldwin, Irani and Love 2001; Currie 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 1998). Hence we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis H1: There is a negative relationship between the contract duration and the client’s 
evaluation of the vendor’s performance in the micro-outsourcing project. 
Our main focus in this study is on the moderating effects of strategic intents of the vendors. Our core 
theoretical argument (Figure 1) is that the strategic intent of micro-outsourcing vendors plays a key role in 
helping them manage longer-duration tasks, thus affecting the impact of project duration on vendor 
performance. We theorize that Goal-focused strategic intent and Competency-focused strategic intent 
have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between project duration and client evaluation of 
vendor performance; and Cost-focused strategic intent has a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research Model 
 
Three reasons underlie our arguments for a positive moderating effect of competency-focused strategic 
intent. First, in competency-focused strategic intent, the signals to the client are about the skills and 
competencies of the vendor which have been identified as an important factor in vendor-client 
outsourcing relationships (Kishore, Rao, Nam, Rajagopalan and Chaudhury 2003). Competency-focus 
strategic intent is reflected in the dealings of the vendor with each interaction between the client and the 
vendor. The attribute or intent that each and every delivery or milestones are ‘competently done’ would 
make the client feel that even though the vendor is taking time, the vendor is doing a good job (Goles 
2003). In other words, the evaluative process associated with the longer duration of the project may not 
leave a dent in the mind of the client when the vendor has a higher competency-focused strategic intent. 
On the contrary, the client may add positive evaluations each time the ‘competency’ is reflected in each 
iteration or interaction with the vendor and its work. Thus, due to the ‘additive effects of competency 
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outcomes’ on evaluations, competency-focused strategic intent is likely to improve the performance of the 
vendor in longer duration projects because the vendor is now more focused on applying the skills and 
competencies necessary to succeed in longer duration projects.  
Second, competency-focused strategic intent shows that the vendor has higher technical and managerial 
competency. Such benchmarking motivates clients to believe that vendors with higher certifications can 
offer superior functional solutions to satisfy clients’ needs because a competent vendor can perform 
complex tasks and provide more functionalities (Lee, Miranda and Kim 2004). Although a complex 
project will take longer time to complete, such complex tasks are appreciated by clients when they are 
accomplished and accompanied by displays of competencies (Susarla, Barua and Whinston 2003). A 
vendor managing complex functionalities competently for a project will get high evaluations from a client. 
Thus, a vendor’s competency-focused strategic and subsequent application of such competency to execute 
a longer complex project will lead to higher evaluations in longer duration projects.  
 
Third, competency strategic intent of a vendor serve as cues that the vendor is more qualified for detailed 
discussions on technology-, task-, or work- related aspects of the project than a less competent vendor 
(Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade 2010). Such cues lead clients to interact with the vendor on higher 
technical, skills and expertise levels. Although long duration projects in micro-outsourcing are ridden 
with risks, detailed interactions help in clarification of doubts and provide clear specifications and plans 
for tasks to be carried out. In other words, some risks and uncertainties associated with longer projects 
are mitigated when the vendor signals competency, resulting in a better performing project and 
subsequent higher evaluation. In line with these arguments, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis H2: Competency-focused Strategic Intent of the vendor positively moderates the 
relationship between the contract duration and the client’s evaluation of the vendor’s 
performance in the micro-outsourcing project. 
 
Greater cost-focused strategic intent inherently implies that the vendor is trying to save on cost at each 
step of the project. This may involve reducing important procedural steps, devoting less hours, or even 
providing a lower quality job to the client (Gopal and Gosain 2010). For example, a cost-focused micro-
outsourcing vendor who is involved with cyber-help or monitoring of a set of Personal Computers or 
servers for a longer period of time, may not update the antivirus software regularly (which is stipulated in 
contract) to minimize update costs, or will not “clean up” the computers regularly (as may be expected). 
Cost-focused strategic intent in these cases thus leads to a poor job or poor show of effectiveness in the 
project. Hence for longer duration projects, cost-focused strategic intent is likely to negatively moderate 
the effect of contract duration on client’s evaluation of the vendor performance because the client has a 
perception that the vendor is less concerned about customer satisfaction of the client or is less aware of 
the client needs, but is rather focused on minimizing its own cost through short-cut measures, low-
performing process or practices, and missing procedures (Westland 2004).  
The resource constraint imperative suggests that cost-focused strategic intent is inherently reflected in 
completing the work with limited resources. In longer projects, low priced micro-outsourcing services, 
constrained by limited resources would result in low performance, leading to low client evaluation. 
Specifically, for complex projects with longer durations, vendors may reduce important procedural steps, 
devote less hours to the project, adopt low-performing practices, short cut measures, and/or miss 
procedures (Gopal and Gosain 2010; Westland 2004). For example, a cost saving vendor may not update 
software needed to execute a project, or may not update a critical maintenance tool. Such resource saving 
behavior would result in a low quality service and low client evaluation.   
Furthermore, cost reduction behavior may lead to a lower level of vendor willingness to commit time and 
resources as needed. Specifically, for a longer duration project, these commitments are building blocks to 
develop and establish business relationships and subsequent partnerships (Haried and Ramamurthy 
2009). With lower resource commitments by the vendor, the client may perceive that the vendor is less 
concerned about quality of the project than about cost; which will lead to low client evaluations. Thus, 
cost-focused strategic intent indicates vendor’s resource constraint and lack of commitment behavior. 
Stronger cost-focused strategic intent indicates that the vendor adopts shortcuts and low performing 
practices in the project, leading to low evaluation. Hence, we hypothesize:   
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Hypothesis H3: Cost-focused Strategic Intent of the vendor negatively moderates the 
relationship between the contract duration and the client’s evaluation of the vendor’s 
performance in the micro-outsourcing project. 
While competency-focused strategic intent and cost-focused strategic intent are reflective of the process 
by which the vendor performs the task, goal-focused strategic intent is more reflective of interim or end 
point goal fulfillment and the alignment of the client’s expectations with final outcomes (Oliver 1980; 
Oliver 1993). We contend that goal-focused strategic intent positively moderates the relationship between 
contract duration and client’s evaluation of the vendor’s performance in the project.  
The effects of a higher goal-focused strategic intent manifest through three main mechanisms. First, if the 
client is more focused on the final result of the project rather than the process, a greater goal-focused 
strategic intent establishes that the vendor achieves goals and ensures that the client sees the goals 
accomplished and that it is satisfied with the final product. Moreover, if the client is more process-focused 
and wants some involvement and verification in each step of the project, goal-focused strategic intent of 
the vendor ensures that it has the capability of structuring a clear process map and hand-holding the 
client through the process to finally deliver a product or service that satisfies the expectations of the client. 
In both cases, clients achieve their objectives and are likely to give vendors a better evaluation. Thus, a 
client (whether process or product centric in its evaluation) may evaluate a longer duration project more 
favorably, because the prior specified goals are fulfilled by the vendor. Hence, we argue that the longer the 
task, the more important it is for vendors to provide a higher goal-focused strategic intent as this would 
provide the client with the assurance that the task has been completed successfully despite the challenges 
and limited resources of the outsourcer. A focus on goals provides the client the confidence that the 
vendor has been able to apply the prior experience of successful projects and usefully apply those 
learnings to the current task.  
Second, in projects with a longer duration, vendors need to communicate clear deadlines and understand 
clients’ requirements for each deadline or interim steps. Vendors with stronger goal-focused strategic 
intent will focus on having a high quality information exchange with their clients as a critical step towards 
meeting project timelines and budgets. This information shared between vendors and clients will create 
complementary knowledge, enabling better performance by vendors, resulting in higher evaluation 
(Kishore, Rao, Nam, Rajagopalan and Chaudhury 2003).  
 
Third, goal focused vendors will cultivate their relationship with clients resulting in development of 
shared goals and a sense of trust (Palvia, King, Xia and Palvia 2010). As highlighted by prior literature, 
relationship quality and shared goals are essential factors for successful sourcing (Levina and Ross 2003). 
Consequently, vendors and clients are likely to maintain good communication in lengthy projects, thereby 
reducing uncertainty. Finally, a vendor with stronger goal-focused strategic intent is likely to handhold 
the client through a long duration project by following a structured reporting process. This not only 
enhances client’s confidence on the vendor’s ability to eventually meet goals, but also reduces uncertainty 
and anxiety during the course of the project. Thus, the client will eventually evaluate a longer duration 
project more favorably. Hence we posit: 
 
Hypothesis H4: Goal-focused Strategic Intent of the vendor positively moderates the 
relationship between the contract duration and the client’s evaluation of the vendor’s 
performance in the micro-outsourcing project. 
 
Research Design and Methodology  
To test our hypotheses, we collected our data from a leading online marketplace for the outsourcing of 
knowledge-based work, including software development services. 1  This marketplace acts as an 
intermediary platform that brings together clients and vendors. Clients seek and evaluate bids from 
vendors on the basis of multiple criteria. Clients categorize each project into a specific area of expertise 
                                                             
1 For reasons of confidentiality, we do not disclose the name of the marketplace.  
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(type of work), provide a project description, and propose a budget and end time. Vendors who are 
registered with the marketplace read the project descriptions and place bids on the basis of price. Thus 
formally, this process is a buyer-determined, reverse, scoring auction (Asker and Cantillon 2008). In 
majority of the projects, all vendors can see the characteristics and bids of competing providers; a few 
follow a sealed-bid format. At the end of the auction, clients evaluate competing bids on the basis of price 
and vendor attributes and award projects. At the completion of a project, clients provide feedback about 
the vendor. A reputation system tracks all feedback ratings a provider receives from historical clients and 
forms a key attribute of vendors at the time of bid evaluation. 
To collect our data, we adopted the following approach and criteria. First, we collected data in the summer 
of 2013 and thus all projects that were completed before August 2013 constituted the long-list. Second, 
out of this long-list, we shortlisted all projects that were categorized as web, web services, or mobile app 
development projects. This ensured that our dataset covered all forms of IT projects that are conducted 
through this mechanism. We scrapped information regarding each project in our shortlist, including the 
auction details, attributes of the vendor and attributes of the client. 
Further, for vendors for which we had scrapped information, we again collected all information regarding 
all projects completed by the vendor that could be categorized as IT projects. By following such a recursive 
process, we were able to gather information on projects that may have been incorrectly categorized as 
non-IT projects. Overall, our dataset covers 6452 IT projects. 
For our dependent variable, we measure performance by the rating provided by the client for the task 
performed by the vendor. The rating is on a continuous scale of 0 to 5, where 0 is the lowest and 5 is the 
highest evaluation. This is consistent with prior research using single rating variables and variables 
measuring customer satisfaction (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig 2000; Khuntia, Mithas, Agarwal and 
Roy 2012). As our independent variable, we measure the contract duration of the task in terms of days 
(Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade 2010). We measure competency-focused strategic intent by the 
number of IT and process related exams successfully completed by the vendor prior to the focal project. 
The number of exams completed by the vendor is visible to the clients before the vendor is selected. These 
exams included technical exams such as PHP and programming exams and are indicative of the 
competency of the vendor. We measure cost-efficiency focused strategic intent by the deviation of the bid 
amount from the mean bid amount for that task. We measure Goal-focused strategic intent by the product 
of proportion of projects completed on time and the proportion of tasks completed on-budget and the 
completion rates. These proportions are also visible to the clients. We control for factors which can 
influence performance of tasks, including vendor experience, vendor expertise, and number of vendor 
reviews. Table 1 summarizes the variables and their measurements. We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
to estimate the following equation: 
 
Performance= f (Duration, Competency, Cost, Goal, Competency x Duration, Cost x Duration,  
Goal x Duration, control variables)                                   .. (i) 
Construct Definition Role in Research 
Model 
Measure in our study 
Client’s Evaluation of 
Vendor Performance in 
Project 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Client’s evaluation of the vendor’s 
performance in the focal project. This is 
evaluated by the client after the project’s 
completion on a continuous scale of 0 to 5, 
where 0 is the lowest and 5 is the highest 
evaluation. 
Contract Duration Independent 
variable 
Duration (in days) of the focal project 
contract.  
Cost-focused Strategic 
Intent of Vendor 
Moderator variable Deviation of winning bid amount from 
mean bid amount for the focal project.  
Cost focused Strategic Intent = (Mean bid 
amount – Vendor’s bid amount)/ Mean bid 
amount. 
Goal-focused Strategic 
Intent of Vendor 
Moderator variable Product of On-Time, On-Budget, and 
Completion rates of the vendor prior to the 
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focal project. 
Goal-focused strategic intent = (on-time 
proportion) x (within-budget proportion) x 
(completion rate proportion). 
Competency-focused 
Strategic Intent of Vendor 
Moderator variable Number of IT Exams and process-related 
exams completed by Vendor prior to the 
focal project. 
Vendor Experience Control variable Total number of projects undertaken by 
the vendor prior to the focal project. 
Vendor Expertise Control variable Average rating (scale of 0 to 5) received by 
the vendor on all projects done by the 
vendor prior to the focal project. 
Vendor Reviews Control variable Total number of prior reviews of the 
vendor prior to starting the focal project. 
Table 1: Variables 
 
Results  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
       Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Client Evaluation of Vendor 
Performance 
3.71 0.97 1.00       
2 Competency-focused 
Strategic Intent  
2.81 2.08 0.01 1.00      
3 Cost-focused Strategic 
Intent  
0.15 0.36 -0.00 -0.05* 1.00     
4 Goal-focused Strategic 
Intent  
0.68 0.23 0.17* 0.05* -0.02 1.00    
5 Contract Duration 10.81 12.05 -0.04* 0.03* -0.16* 0.02 1.00   
6 Vendor Experience 46.31 134.91 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.05* -0.07* 1.00  
7 Vendor Expertise 3.73 0.78 0.05* 0.09* -0.002 0.45* 0.02 0.005 1.00 
8 Vendor Reviews 22.69 71.29 0.05* 0.03* -0.007 0.06* -0.05* 0.25* -0.02 
N = 6452. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Prior to discussing the results, we discuss the robustness and validity tests we conducted to assess the 
robustness of our findings. First, we performed the Harman’s one-factor test and the marker variable test 
(Lindell and Whitney 2001). In Harman’s test, no single major factor emerged, and in the marker-variable 
tests, the correlations among the variables did not change significantly after accounting for common 
method variance. Thus, results of both tests suggest that common method bias is not a significant 
concern. Furthermore, since our core theory pertains to interaction effects, common method variance is 
even less of a concern because common method variance reduces the likelihood of detecting interaction 
effects (Wall, Jackson, Mullarkey and Parker 1996).  
Second, we checked for multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation factors (VIF). In all 
equations, the maximum VIF and the average VIF were well below suggested limits, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a significant concern. Third, White (1980) tests for heteroskedasticity did not 
suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, as suggested in the literature (Greene 2008), we 
use robust standard errors in all our estimations.2 Last, we performed several diagnostic checks including 
testing for normality of residuals, outliers, and influential observations, and found no problems or 
violations of assumptions (Greene 2008). 
                                                             
2 Our results remain unchanged whether we use robust or non-robust standard errors. 
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Table 3 presents the results. Examining the main effects (column 2), we find that the main effect of 
Contract Duration is negative and significant (β = -0.004, p < 0.01). Thus H1 is supported. This is 
consistent with prior research that longer duration projects perform worse compared to shorter duration 
projects (Baldwin, Irani and Love 2001; Currie 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lee, Miranda and Kim 
2004; Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade 2010). Also, interestingly, only Goal-focused strategic intent 
has a positive and significant relationship with performance, whereas the other two types of strategic 
intent have no significant relationship with performance. Columns (6) includes all the two-way 
interaction terms to test hypotheses H2-H4. F-tests of joint significance of the interaction terms were 
rejected, suggesting rejection of the null that the interaction terms are jointly zero. As shown in column 
(6), the interaction term (Competency x Contract Duration) is significant and positive (β = 0.001, p < 
0.01), thereby supporting H2. We also find support for H3 as the interaction term (Cost x Contract 
Duration) is significant and negative (column 6, β = -0.0034, p < 0.10). Finally, the interaction term (Goal 
x Contract Duration) is significant and positive (β = 0.02, p < 0.01), thereby supporting H4. We also ran 
models by including the interaction terms one at a time into the regression (columns 3-5), and found 
similar results. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 VARIABLES Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Client 
Evaluation 
Competency-focused Strategic 
intent (Competency) 
 -0.0001 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.0004 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Cost-focused Strategic intent (Cost)  -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
 0.01 
(0.04) 
Goal-focused Strategic intent (Goal)     0.074*** 
(0.007) 
   0.074*** 
(0.007) 
   0.074*** 
(0.007) 
   0.053*** 
(0.009) 
   0.053*** 
(0.009) 
Contract Duration  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
Competency x Contract Duration   0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
     0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
Cost x Contract Duration    -0.0031* 
(0.0017) 
 -0.0034* 
(0.0019) 
Goal x Contract Duration     0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
Vendor Experience 0.036* 
(0.2) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.021) 
Vendor Expertise 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.037* 
(0.02) 
0.037* 
(0.02) 
0.038* 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Vendor Rating 0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.001 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
N 6452 6452 6452 6452 6452 6452 
R-square 0.12 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 
F-statistic 8.25*** 20.57*** 18.63*** 18.01*** 18.69*** 15.52*** 
∆F  30.08*** 11.12*** 2.71*** 9.05*** 5.96*** 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (2) Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.  
Table 3: Results 
 
Figure 2 depicts the interaction plots, facilitating a graphical interpretation of the interaction effects. As 
the graphs suggest, the interactions and differences in slopes are substantively significant, in addition to 
being statistically significant.  
 
 Strategic Intent in Micro-Outsourcing 
  
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 12 
 
Figure 2: Graphical Interpretation of Results 
Discussion 
Findings 
In this study, we set out to explore a new type of outsourcing, which is changing the way vendors and 
clients interact, micro-outsourcing. Due to the nature and origins of micro-outsourcing it is usually more 
amenable to short duration and smaller projects. Nonetheless, vendors may face long and complex 
projects that require distinct strategies.  In this study, we examined the types of strategies that may shape 
vendors ability for managing the complexity that arise out of longer duration projects.  
 
The results shown on Table 3 provide support for the impact of strategic intent and contract duration on 
client’s evaluation of the vendor’s performance in the project. We find support for Hypothesis H1, which 
argued that longer duration projects receive lower client evaluations in micro-outsourcing. Our results 
show support for Hypothesis 2, which postulated that vendor’s competency-focused strategic intent 
positively influences the relationship between contract duration and client’s evaluation of the vendor in 
the project. Hence, vendors that exhibit their skills to clients through good deliveries will receive positive 
evaluations despite the duration of the project. In Hypothesis 3, we proposed that vendors’ with a cost-
focused strategic intent will receive lower evaluations in projects of a longer duration. Our analysis shows 
support for Hypothesis 3 and suggests that when vendors reduce the amount of resources that they deploy 
to undertake clients’ projects with the purpose of decreasing costs, they may deliver a poor quality result 
to clients, showing low competencies and not meeting client expectations. These factors will lead to a 
poorer evaluation of the vendor. In Hypothesis 4, we examine the relationship between vendors’ goal-
focused strategic intent, contract duration, and client’s evaluation of vendors in the project. We find 
support for our theory and claim that when vendors assure clients that projects will be successfully 
delivered despite vendors’ resource constraints, a long project may culminate with a more positive 
evaluation for the vendor. Thus, overall, in longer duration projects, our findings suggest that in projects 
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with higher contract duration, micro-outsourcing vendors with a higher goal-focused and competency-
focused strategic intent perform better than vendors with a higher cost-focused strategic intent. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our research has limitations which can serve as starting points for future research. First, we examine 
performance of the vendor as evaluated by the client. Although this provides an important perspective on 
vendor performance, future research can extend our study to other dimensions or characterizations of 
performance. Second, we focused on IT outsourcing on one specific marketplace. Although this enhances 
internal validity of the findings, future studies can examine other kinds of outsourcing and on other 
platforms, in order to assess generalizability of our findings.  
 
Contributions to Research and Practice 
Our study offers several main contributions to the IS literature. First, we show that the effects of contract 
duration on performance of IT outsourced projects in the micro-outsourced context are contingent upon 
the strategic intent of the vendor. As discussed earlier, prior research has found relatively mixed results 
pertaining to the effects of contract duration on performance. For instance, some scholars suggest that 
contract duration has a positive effect on performance (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig 2000; Lee, 
Miranda and Kim 2004) whereas other findings in the literature indicate that shorter projects have better 
ITO outcomes (Baldwin, Irani and Love 2001; Currie 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 1998). Our results 
contribute to this literature and suggest that one of the missing pieces in the puzzle, at least in the micro-
outsourcing context, may be the strategic intent of the vendor (supplier). Second, prior research has 
generally put relatively more focus on the client side of IT outsourcing. Our study focuses on the vendor 
factors and suggests that vendors participating in micro-outsourcing will be able to deal with complex 
longer-duration projects and receive positive evaluations if they establish the appropriate strategic 
intents.  
 
Third, our study contributes to the academic discourse on the kind of strategy that is appropriate to 
ensure alignment with business and IT contexts (Hah and Bharadwaj 2012; Setia, Venkatesh and Joglekar 
2013; Tallon 2007; Tallon and Pinsonneault 2011). Our results suggest that for micro-outsourcing firms 
striving to perform longer duration projects, a multi-pronged strategy comprising goal and competency 
focus is superior compared to a cost-focused strategy. Finally, this study also has implications for 
ambidextrous strategies to manage duality in the context of IT micro-outsourcing. More specifically, while 
IT micro-outsourcing inherently endears itself to smaller less resource-rich vendors, it is pertinent for 
these vendors to be ambidextrous in their strategic intent, focusing on goals and competence while also 
minimizing a cost-focus. 
 
For practicing managers, our research contributes by suggesting that client firms willing to utilize micro-
outsourcing for longer duration and complex projects should look for vendors either a competency-
focused strategic intent or goal-focused strategic intent. Second, for vendors, our results suggest that a 
multi-pronged strategic intent focusing on competency and goals may be better than a single strategic 
focus when it comes to managing projects of a longer contract duration. Third, because success in micro-
outsourcing on IT platforms is often dependent on the signaling that vendors provide to potential clients, 
our results suggest that signaling of the appropriate strategic intent is an important component of success. 
The study has broader implications for how vendors may want to signal to clients their skills, capabilities, 
and prior records. For instance, vendors seeking to achieve success and win bids for longer duration high-
valued projects, may do well to highlight in their portfolios their prior record of projects completed 
successfully, along with their portfolio of skills and competencies that they possess, in order to win clients 
and successfully compete in the highly competitive micro-outsourcing marketplace. Taken together, the 
findings of this study shed new light on the role of the strategic intent of vendors as an important factor in 
the micro-outsourcing context.      
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